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if he takes no other security, whether a conveyance has been made or
not."
The rule in Kentucky appears to be that the right to a decree of
specific performance of a contract relating to realty or personalty is
based on the fact that damages for breach cannot be adequately com-
pensated for in law." There are very few cases in Kentucky granting
specific performance of an executory contract in favor of the vendor,
nor in those few do the courts state the basis for the holding.
After an analytical examination of the authorities it does not
appear that the court of equity regards so material the particular
thing asked for. The complainant may either desire a specific thing
or a sum of money. The court regards the position of the party asking
the relief rather than the subject matter of the contract. It is the
relation of the particular Individual to the subject matter which the
court regards as important. The question is, considering the individ-
ual and the relief which he could under the circumstances secure at
law, is the legal remedy as to him adequate? If not, he will be grant-
ed specific performance even though he asked only for a sum of money.
This relief will be granted, not on the theory of mutuality or fore-
closure of redemption, but merely because of the inadequacy of the
remedy at law.
JOHN EVANiS.
A STERILIZATION LAW FOR KENTUCKY-ITS
CONSTITUTIONALITY
Proposed statute:
(1) Whenever the Superintendent or Warden of the State's re-
formatories or hospitals for the insane or feeble-minded shall be of the
opinion that it is for the best interest of the patient or inmate and
society that any inmate of the institution under his care should be
sexually sterilized, such superintendent or warden is hereby author-
ized to cause to be performed by some capable physician or surgeon
the operation of sterilization on any patient or inmate confined in
such institution affected with insanity, idiocy, imbecility, feeble-
mindedness, or epilepsy: provided that such superintendent or warden
shall have first complied with the requirements of this act.
(2) Such superintendent or warden shall first present to the
trustees or managers of his hospital or reformatory a petition stating
the facts of the cause and the ground of his opinion, verified by his
affidavit to the best of his knowledge and belief and praying that an
order may be entered by said trustees or managers requiring them to
have performed by some competent physician to be designated by him
in his petition or by said trustees or managers in their order upon the
-Farmer & Arnold v. Samuel, 14 Ky. 187 (1823).
" Edelen v. W. B. Samuel & Co., 126 Ky. 295, 130 S. W. 360 (1907).
STUDENT NOTES
Inmate of his institution named in such petition, the operation of
vasectomy if upon a male and of salpingectomy if upon a female.
A copy of said petition must be served upon the inmate together
with notice in writing designating the time and place in the said in-
stitution, not less than thirty days before the presentation of such
petition to said trustees or managers, when and where said trustees
or managers may hear and act upon such petition. A copy of said pe-
tition and notice shall also be served upon the legal guardian or com-
mittee of the said inmate, if such guardian or committee be known to
the said superintendent or warden and if there be no such guardian
or committee or none such be known to the said superintendent or
warden, then the said superintendent or warden shall apply to the
Circuit Court of the county or city in which his said institution is
situated, or to the judge thereof in vacation who by proper order en-
tered in the common law order book of the said court shall appoint
some suitable person to act as guardian of said inmate during and for
the purpose of proceeding under this act, to defend the rights and in-
terests of said inmate, and the guardian so appointed shall be paid by
the institution a fee not exceeding five dollars as may be determined
by the judge of said court for his services under said appointment and
such guardian shall be served likewise with a copy of the aforesaid
petition and notice. Such guardian may be removed or discharged at
any time by the said court or judge thereof in vacation and a new
guardian appointed and substituted in his place. If such inmate be an
Infant having living parents whose names and addresses are known to
said superintendent or warden, they or either of them as the case may
be, shall be served likewise with a copy of said petition and notice
aforesaid. The trustees or managers may receive and consider as evi-
dence at the said hearing, the commitment papers and other records
of said inmate in any of the aforesaid named institutions as certified
by the superintendent or warden thereof, together with other such
legal evidence as may be offered by any party to the proceedings.
Any member of said trustees or managers shall have power to admin-
ister oaths to any witness at such hearings. Depositions may be taken
by any party after due notice and read in evidence if otherwise perti-
nent. The said trustees or managers shall preserve and keep all
records of evidence afforded at such hearing and have reduced to writ-
ing in duplicate all oral evidence so heard to be kept with its records.
Any party to the said proceedings shall have the right to be rep-
resented by counsel at such hearings.
The purpose of said proceedings, findings and orders of said su-
perintendents or managers shall be for the betterment of the physical,
mental, neural, or psychic condition of the inmate, or to protect
society from the menace of procreation by said inmate, and not in
any manner as a punitive measure; and no person shall be sterilized
under the authority of the act except that such operation shall be
bound to be necessary to improve the physical, mental, neural, or
psyeji.c condition of the inmate, or to prevent such inmate from pro-
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ducing offspring that would probably become a menace to society, or
a ward of the state.
The trustees or managers may deny the prayer of such petition,
or if they shall find that the said inmate Is insane, idiotic, feeblemind-
ed, or epileptic and is the probable potential parent of socially in-
adequate offspring likewise afflicted, that the said inmate may be sex-
ually sterilized without detriment to his or her general health, and
that the welfare of the inmate and of society will be promoted by such
sterilization, the said trustees or managers may order the said
superintendent or warden to have performed by some competent phy-
sician to be named in such order upon the said inmate after not less
than thirty days from the date of such order, the operation of vasec-
tomy, if a male, or of salpingectomy, if a female; provided that noth-
ing in this act shall be construed to authorize the operation of castra-
tion nor the removal of sound organs from the body.
(3) From any order so entered by the trustees or managers the
said superintendent or warden of the said inmate or his or her com-
mittee or guardian or parent or next friend shall within thirty days
after the date of such order have a right of appeal to the Circuit Court
of the county or city in which the said institution is situated, which
appeal may be taken by giving notice thereof in writing to any mem-
ber of said trustees or managers, and to the other parties of the said
proceedings, whereupon the said superintendent or warden shall forth-
with cause a copy of the petition, notice, evidence, and orders of said
trustees or managers certified by the chairman in his absence by any
other member thereof, to the clerk of the said Circuit Court, who shall
file the same and docket the appeal to be heard and determined by the
said court as soon thereafter as may be practicable. The said court
in determining such appeal may consider the records of the proceed-
ings before the said trustees or managers, including the evidence as
the said court may consider pertinent and proper that may be offered
to the said court by the party to the appeal. Upon such appeal the
said court may affirm, revise, or reverse the orders of said trustees or
managers appealed from and may enter such order as it deems just
and right and which it shall certify to said trustees or managers. The
pendency of such appeal shall stay proceedings under the order of the
trustees or managers until the appeal is determined.
(4) Any party to such appeal in the Circuit Court may within
thirty days after the date of the final order therein apply for an appeal
to the Court of Appeals which may grant or refuse such appeal and
shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the same upon the record
of trial in the Circuit Court and to enter such order as it may find
that the Circuit Court should have entered. The pendency of an
appeal in the Court of Appeals shall operate as a stay of proceedings
under any orders of the said trustees or managers or of the Circuit
Court until the appeal be determined by the Court of Appeals.
(5) Neither any of said superintendents or wardens nor any
other person legally participating in the execution of the provisions
STUDENT NoTEs
of this act shall be liable either civilly or criminally on account of
said participation.
(6) Nothing in this act shall be construed so as to prevent the
medical or surgical treatment for sound therapeutic reasons of any
person in the state, by a physician or surgeon licensed in the state,
which treatment may incidentally involve the nullification or destruc-
tion of the productive fuaction.
(7) All laws or parts of laws in conflict herewith are hereby re-
pealed.
CONSTITUTIONALITY
In considering the constitutionality of the above statute it Is well
to consider the failure of various sterilization statutes, and in view of
their failure to see if the above statute has remedied their defects.
DuE PRocEss OF LAW
On four occasions such statutps have been declared unconstitu-
tional because they denied the due process of law." "Due process of
law means that every person must have his day in court, and this is
as old as the Magna Charter; that some time in the proceeding he
must be confronted by his accuser and given a public hearing."2 An
adjudication before a competent and impartial tribunal, with the
right of appeal, after reasonable notice to the parties interested, and
an opportunity to be heard, seems to be sufficient to fulfill all the con-
stitutional requirements.
In Davis v. 1erry," the court held that due process was denied
as no notice to the subject was given. The prisoner first knew of the
proceedings after being advised of the order after a private hearing.
In Williams v. Smith, it was held that the statute denied due process
because the statute gave the inmate no opportunity to cross-examine
the board experts who decided upon the operation, to controvert their
opinion, or to establish that he was not in the class designated by the
statute. Brewer v. Bulk,6 held that a statute authorizing sterilization
of mentally defective persons without notice or hearing is a violation
of the due process of law. The court distinguished the North Caro-
lina statute from the Virginia statute. On April 5, 1933, the legisla-
ture of North Carolina passed an amendment correcting the statute,
and substantially adopted the Virginia procedure.
'Williams v. Smith, 190 Ind. 526, 131 N. E. 2 (1921); Davis v.
Berry, 216 Fed. 413 (1914); Brewer v. Bulk, 204 N. Car. 186, 167 S. E.
638 (1933); Cline v. Oregon State Bd. of Eugenics, Circuit Court of
Marion County (Dec. 13, 1921).
2 Davis v. Berry, supra note 1.
' Buck v. Bell, 274 U. S. 200 (1927); Williams v. Smith, supra,
note 1; Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 4 Sup. Ct. 111 (1884);





In Buck v. Bel,7 the statute was held to provide for ample notice
by personal service, regular proceedings, opportunity to defend, and
the right of appeal. Mr. Justice Holmes, in summing up the proce-
dural problem said, "There can be no doubt that as far as procedure
is concerned the rights of the patient are most carefully considered,
and as every step in this case was taken in scrupulous compliance
with the statute and after months of observation there can be no doubt
that in this respect. the plaintiff in error has had due process of law."
In Smith v. Command,8 the Michigan statute was held constitutional
as not denying the due process of law for it provides opportunity to
defend with right of appeal. In Board of Eugenics v. Troutman," the
statute was held to provide due process of law as "the proceeding is
pursuant to summons duly issued and served, and every safeguard
known to a regular and orderly hearing in a court, with the right of
appeal afforded. The act not only affords due process but unless writ-
ten assent is procured, requires a complete open judicial proceeding."
In State ex rel. Smith v. Schaffer,"0 the court held there was no denial
of due process of law where, at the hearing, the inmate may be rep-
resented by counsel and may introduce such evidence as he may
desire, although no right of appeal is given.
The proposed statute provides for ample notice by personal serv-
ice, regular proceedings, opportunity to defend, the right of appeal,
and the right to be represented by counsel. Such provisions have been
held not to violate the due process clause of the constitution by the
great majority of the state courts and by the highest court in the land.
As the statute has none of the defects of the earliet state statutes de-
clared unconstitutional it is not open to attack from this angle.
EQUAL PROTECTION
Four cases have held sterilization statutes unconstitutional in
that they deny the equal protection of the laws; in other words, that
they represent class legislation. Statutes similar to the proposed stat-
ute, which applied only to the inmates in the state institutions have
been declared unconstitutional by the courts of New Jersey, Michigan,
and New York, for the reason that the statutes set up a class, the
feeble-minded, the insane, and epileptic, then discriminated between
members of that class who were inmates and those who were not so
7 Supra, note 3.
8231 Mich. 409, 204 N. W. 140 (1925). "Regular proceedings are
followed and opportunities to defend with the right of appeal are pro-
vided, nothing further is required of the 'due process' clause of the
constitution."
950 Idaho 673, 299 Pac. 668 (1931).
10126 Kan. 607, 270 Pac. 604 (1928).
1Court citing Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U. S. 505 (1903). "Due
process of law is not necessarily judicial process nor is the right of
appeal essential to due process of law." Other case holding no denial
of due process of law, In re Main, 162 Okla. 65, 19 Pac. (2d) 153
(1933).
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confined." The argument of the New Jersey Court was that society
at large will be as injuriously affected by the procreation of the class
who are not confined in such institutions as it will by those who are
confined, and that the law should encompass the latter, who greatly
outnumber the former, for the reason that the inmate is rendered un-
productive, at least temporarily, by confinement. Statutes have been
enacted in Iowa,"' South Dakota, Idaho,16 Michigan," and Oregon,"
which overcome this objection and apply to all feeble-minded persons
In the state who shall be deemed proper for sterilization.
In Buck v. Bell,1 the court said, in holding the Virginia statute
was not unconstitutional for the failure to extend the provision to
persons outside the institutions named, that "the law does all that is
needed when it does all that it can, indicates a policy, applies it to all
within the lines, and seeks to bring within the lines all similarity sit-
uated so far and so fast as its means allow. Of course, so far as the
operations enable those, who otherwise must be kept confined, to be
returned to the world, and throws open the asylum to others, the
equality aimed at will be more nearly reached." In State v. Trout-
man," the court after considering Osborn v. Thompson," and Smith V.
Board of ExaminersU follows Buck v. Bell," as the better rule and
holds that the sterilization law does not create a class nor discrimi-
nate against any within the class affected.2' In Davis, Warden, v. Wal-
ton,25 the court held the authorization of sterilization of mental defec-
tives confined in asylums or penal institutions was not class legisla-
tion denying equal protection of the laws. The Court cited cases pro
and con and followed Buck v. Bell, saying, "It is, of course, elementary
that the Supreme Court of the United States is the arbiter to deter-
mine whether or not a law offends against the Constitution of the
United States. We are of the opinion that the rule announced by that
court in the case of Buck v. Bell, is a complete answer to the claim
"Smith v. Board of Examiners, 85 N. J. L. 46, 88 Atl. 936
(1913); Haynes v. Lapeer, 201 Mich. 138, 166 N. W. 938 (1918); In re
Thompson, 103 Misc. 23, 169 N. Y. Supp. 638 (1918); State v. Feilin, 70
Wash. 65, 126 Pac. 75 (1912). (This case involved sterilization as a
punishment.)
"Smith v. Board of Examiners, supra, note 12.
"Iowa Code, 1931, 2437-CL-2437-22.
S. Dak. Laws 1921, C235, amended, Laws 1925, C164.
Idaho Laws, 1925, C194.
M ichigan Acts, 1923, No. 285.
"Oregon Laws, 1923, 0194, amended, Laws 1924, C198.
274 U. S. 200 (1927).
"Supra, note 9.
"169 N. Y. Supp. 1094 (1918).
"Supra, note 12.
2Supra, note 19.
21 Court cites State v. Horn, 27 Idaho 782, 152 Pac. 275 (1915),
holding: "This clause only requires that the same means and methods
be applied impartially to all the constituents of a class, so that the
law may operate equally and uniformly upon all persons subject to
such legislation shall be treated alike under like circumstances."
"74 Utah 80, 276 Pac. 921 (1929).
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here made by the appellant that the law under which this proceeding
is had offends the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States." In State ex rel. Smith," the court followed Buck v.
Bell, and held the law relating to sterilization of inmates in certain
state institutions was not unconstitutional as a denial of the equal
protection clause.
The proposed statute only applies to those confined in state Insti-
tutions. Such a statute, by the weight of authority and the outstand-
ing decision of Buck v. Bell, would be constitutional and not in viola-
tion of the equal protection clause. There is no arbitrary discrimina-
tion between members of a class, as all feeble-minded, insane, or epi-
leptics are eligible for commitment to an institution, and any person
outside the institution of that class, by the process of commitment
and hearing, can be sterilized under the act. "The provision that the
act shall apply only to inmates does not limit the purpose of such leg-
islation which is to promote the well-being of society, by cutting off
the procreative powers of like feeble-minded within the state. It
merely makes commitment to an institution one step in the steriliza-
tion proceedings and creates a safeguard to the individual in afford-
ing an opportunity for a more careful and extended examination than
might otherwise be possible."' The proposed statute is not open to
attack from this angle as it is not a denial of the equal protection
clause.
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUN ISHrENT
Another ground upon which sterilization statutes have been de-
clared unconstitutional is the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. The Federal and State constitutions both provide that
no cruel or unusual punishment shall be inflicted.23 However, the
Eighth Amendment of the Federal Constitution does not apply to the
state legislature.3
In Davis v. Berry, the act providing for the performance of the
operation of vasectomy on the criminal twice convicted of a felony was
held unconstitutional as providing a cruel and unusual punishment.
In Mickle v. Henrich," the act in terms applied only to persons con-
victed of rape upon a female child under the age of 10 years, and was
held unconstitutional. In State v. Feilenn an act authorizing the court
to direct the performance of an operation for the prevention of pro-
creation on a person adjudged guilty of statutory rape, was held not
invalid as authorizing cruel and unusual punishment. These acts In
no way referred to feeble-minded persons.
Supra, note 10.
60 Am. L. Rev. 275 (1926).
U. S. Const. Amend. 8; Ky. Const. Sec. 17.
"Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349, 30 Sup. Ct. 544 (1910);
Smith v. Command, supra, note 8.
'4216 Fed. 413 (1914).
262 Fed. 687 (1918).
"70 Wish. 65, 126 Pac. 75 (1912).
STUDENT NOTES
In Smith v. Comman,32A the court said in holding the statute pro-
viding for the sterilization of feeble-minded persons constitutional
that, "The only purpose of this constitutional provision is to place a
limitation on the power of the legislature in fixing punishment for
crime. There Is no element of punishment involved in the steriliza-
tion of feeble-minded persons. In this respect it is analogous to com-
pulsory vaccination. Both are nonpunitive. It is therefore plainly ap-
parent that the constitutional inhibition against cruel or unusual pun-
Ishment has no applications to the surgical treatment of feeble-minded
persons. It has reference only to punishment inflicted after convic-
tions of crimes." In Buck v. Priddy,3 the court said "The act is not a
penal measure. The purpose of the legislature was not to punish but
protect the class of socially inadequate citizens named therein from
themselves, and to promote the welfare of society by mitigating race
degeneracy, and causing an increase in the average standard of intelli-
gence of the people of the state." In Osborn v. Thompson,3' the court
said, "The operation upon the feeble-minded is in no sense in the
nature of a penalty, and therefore whether it is an unusual and cruel
punishment Is not involved." From these cases and others it can be
seen that the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment found in the state constitution is simply a limitation on the
power of the legislature to fix punishment for crime; it has no appli-
cation to the surgical treatment of feeble-minded persons.
The proposed statute expressly provides that the operation shall
not, in any manner, be performed as a punitive measure. The pro-
posed statute is free from any attack from this angle.
PorxcE PowF
It has been held in one case that these statutes involve an unrea-
sonable exercise of the police power. It is not to be denied that the
state in acting for the public welfare, may impose reasonable restric-
tions upon the natural and constitutional rights of its citizens,; but
32A 2 3 1 Mich 409, 204 N. W. 140 (1925).
3143 Va. 210 (1925).
3 103 Misc. Rep. 23, 169 N. Y. Supp. 638, affirmed without opinion
in 185 App. Div. 902, 171 N. Y. Supp. 1094 (1918).
6 State v. Troutman, supra, note 9; "The operation known as
vasectomy is not usually considered cruel and inhuman, nor is it under
the Idaho law inflicted as a punishment." Davis, Warden, v. Walton,
supra, note 25. In re Main. supra, note 11. "The record herein
affords uncontradicted evidence to support the view of the trial court
that vasectomy Is not cruel, inhuman, unreasonable, or oppressive"
and holds that the inhibition against cruel and unusual punishment
has no application to surgical treatment of feeble-minded persons, for
the constitutional inhibition only has reference to punishment after
conviction of crimes.
- In re Thompson, 169 N. Y. Supp. 638 (1918).
"Buck v. Bell, 274 U. S. 200 (1927); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S.
27 (1885); Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133 (1894); Smith v. Command,
supra, note 8.
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it is urged that these statutes transcend legislative powers, violate the
constitution, and are unreasonable and void."
In Smith v. Command," the court said in holding the statute In
the proper exercise of the police power "what are the legal rights of
this class of citizens as to the procreation of children? It Is true that
the right to beget children is a natural and a constitutional right, but
it is equally true that no citizen has any rights superior to the com-
mon welfare; measured by its injurious effect upon society, what right
has any citizen or class of citizens to beget children with an inherited
tendency to crime, feeble-mindedness, idiocy, or imbecility? ....
Under the circumstances it was not only its (legislature's) right, but
it was its duty to enact some legislation that would protect the people
and preserve the race from the known effects of the procreation of
children by the feeble-minded, the idiots, and the imbeciles." In
Buck v. Bel7," in holding the statute a valid exercise of the police
power, the court said, "We have seen more than once that the public
welfare may call upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be
strange if it could not call upon those who already sap the strength
of the state for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by
those concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with incompe-
tents. It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute
the degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their Im-
becility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit for contin-
uing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination
is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes."" The state
may always, in acting for the public good, exercise its police power by
imposing reasonable restrictions upon the rights of its citizens. The
right of the individual must be made subservient to that of the com-
munity.
That the state has the power to take and keep in its custody, for
the good of the individual and for the welfare of society, persons af-
flicted mentally, is well settled, nor is it to be doubted that when so
held in custodial care, such persons may be segregated to prevent pro-
creation. "Is this the sole remedy available to organized society?
Must such persons languish for life in custody and must the govern-
ment bear the perpetual burden of their maintaining them if it would
"In re Thompson, supra, note 36, "The entire purpose of the en-
actment seems to be to save expense to future generations in the opera-
tion of eleemosynary institutions organized by the people of the state
to care for those who are afflicted. . . .Then the state could be justi-
fied in turning all the people of this class at large to find their own
way, trusting that they in accordance with the theory of the law,
could no longer procreate; the state being thus relieved of their care
during their lives and freed from the danger of the burden in the
future of their abnormal offspring. Such does not seem to this court
to be the proper exercise of the police power."
"Supra, note S.
4Supra, note 37.
"Jacobson V. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11 (1904). As to the exer-
cise of the police power in compulsory vaccination.
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protect itself against the multiplication of their kind, and must this
be so even though a simple surgical operation not appreciably danger-
ous and involving the removal of no sound organs from the body,
might be discharged from custody and become self supporting to the
great advantage of society? May not one liberty be thus restored
through the deprivation of another liberty?"' 2
The police power is held by the great weight of authority and the
Supreme Court of the nation (while only denied by one state) to be
broad enough to embrace sterilization of the mentally defective." The
proposed statute meets no objection from this angle.
As we have seen, the proposed statute provides for the due process
of law; it does not violate the equal protection clause; it meets the
constitutional objection to cruel and unusual punishment; it is a valid
exercise of the police power. If the proposed statute would be adopted
in Kentucky its constitutionality could not be questioned.
JAY F. AnwoLD.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-RIGHT TO ARREST WITHOUT A
WARRANT-FELONIES
Five factual situations present themselves in which there is a
right to arrest without a warrant In the case of felonies: (1) Where
it would seem that a felony is about to be committed by the person ar-
rested, (2) where the person arrested is in the act of committing a
felony, (3) where the person arrested has committed a felony, (4)
where a felony has been committed and the person arrested is reason-
ably suspected of having committed it, and (5) where no felony has
been committed, but the person arrested is reasonably suspected of
having committed one. The aim of this note is to show what are the
rules as to arrest without a warrant applicable to each situation, both
at the common law and in Kentucky. The common law rule will be
taken up first, and then the rule in Kentucky.
At common law, an officer may arrest without a warrant to pre-
vent the commission of a felony. An officer must always interfere to
prevent an attempted felony; he may arrest the offender if necessary,
even though the attempt to commit the felony be only a misdemeanor.
1
This statement represents the weight of authority in this country. In
Geroux v. Tihe State,2 it was held that an officer may arrest to prevent
an injury where an injury is about to be inflicted or parties are then
in the act of preparation for its immediate infliction, but not where
a 11 Va. L. Rev. 296 (1925).
"State ex rel. Smith v. Schaffer, supra, note 10; State v. Trout-
man, supra, note 9; Brewer v. Bulk, supra, note 1. Other decisions
never questioning that sterilization of the mentally deficient is a valid
exercise of the police power.
*Clark's Crim. Pro., Secs. 10-12; 9 Halsbury's Laws of England
2(S6.
' 40 Tex. 97 (1874).
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